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STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Did the Court of Appeals err in affirming the trial court's dismissal with prejudice
instead of dismissing Plaintiff Layne Hess's ("Mr. Hess" or "Plaintiff) Complaint
without prejudice when the Court of Appeals (despite reversing the trial court's legal
conclusion) ruled on the merits of the claims and allegations, without allowing Plaintiff
an opportunity to amend his Complaint. [June 21, 2007 Opinion ("Opinion") atffif13,
26].
The district court's dismissal of Plaintiff s Complaint is reviewed by this Court for
correctness and in reaching its decision this Court must accept the Complaint's factual
allegations as true and draw all inference's in Plaintiffs favor. See Stokes v. Wagoner,
1999 UT 94, f6, 987 P.2d 602.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This petition for rehearing arises from this Court's affirming of the trial court's
dismissal with prejudice of Plaintiff s Complaint despite making its determination on
grounds other than those relied upon by the trial court. [Opinion at f 13].
On January 9, 2006, Defendant filed her Motion for Sanctions and Motion for
Dismissal with Prejudice along with supporting memoranda. [R. at 15-32]. Defendant's
motions essentially asserted that Mr. Hess' claims were barred by the Utah Supreme
Court's decision in Jackson v. Brown. 904 P.2d 685 (Utah 1995), which held that Utah's
cause of action for breach of an agreement to marry was abolished. [R. at 15-32].

1

Plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition to Plaintiffs motions on January 27, 2006,
and Defendant filed a reply memorandum on February 9, 2006. [R. at 34-54], Following
briefing, a hearing was held before the Honorable Dennis J. Frederick on April 10, 2006.
[R. at 58, 88]. By its April 11, 2006 Minute Entry, the trial court issued its decision
granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, but denying Defendant's Motion for Sanctions.
[R. at 61-63]. The trial court signed a Final Order Dismissing Action with Prejudice on
April 25, 2006. [R. at 64-65].
Plaintiff filed his Notice of Appeal of the Final Order Dismissing Action with
Prejudice on May 25, 2006. [R. at 70-71]. Defendant filed her Notice of Cross-Appeal
on May 31,2006, by which Defendant seeks a reversal of the trial court's denial of
Defendant's Motion for Sanctions. [R. at 72].
Oral argument on the parties' cross-appeals was held on May 31, 2007. On June
21, 2007, this Court issued its Opinion, which reversed the trial court's detennination that
Jackson v. Brown abolished all causes of action arising from a termination of an
agreement to marry, but affirmed the trial court's dismissal with prejudice after
considering the sufficiency of the facts alleged by Plaintiff to support Plaintiffs claims.
[Opinion atffi[13-26].
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The following facts are relevant to Mr. Hess' Petition for Rehearing:
1.

On January 9, 2006, Defendant filed her Motion for Sanctions and Motion

for Dismissal with Prejudice along with supporting memoranda. [R. at 15-32].
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prejudice after considering the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the Complaint by
Plaintiff to support Plaintiffs claims. [Opinion at ff 13-26].
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court erred in affirming the trial court's dismissal with prejudice even though
this Court specifically reversed the trial court's determination that Mr. Hess' claims were
barred by the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Jackson v. Brown. This Court affirmed
the trial court's dismissal with prejudice on the alternative grounds that Hess failed to
allege fact sufficient to support its claims. However, as a general rule, a Rule 12(b)(6)
dismissal should be without prejudice because it only addresses the formal sufficiency of
the Complaint and not the factual merit of the claims. Accordingly, this Court should
revise its opinion to clarify that the dismissal of Plaintiff s claims is without prejudice, so
that Plaintiff has the opportunity to file an amended complaint.
ARGUMENT
L

THIS COURT SHOULD CLARIFY THAT THE DISMISSAL OF
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT IS WITHOUT PREJUDICE, THUS
ALLOWING PLAINTIFF AN OPPORTUNITY TO AMEND HIS
COMPLAINT.
This Court should clarify that the dismissal of Plaintiff s Complaint is without

prejudice, as is appropriate for a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal based on the sufficiency (or lack
thereof) of the allegations of the Complaint.1 Rule 8(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure requires that a Complaint contain a "short and plain statement... showing that
1

Although this Court did not directly state that its dismissal on alternative grounds was with or without prejudice,
by simply affirming the trial court's dismissal, which was with prejudice, it must be assumed that Plaintiffs'
Complaint is dismissed with prejudice.
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unable to cure the defects in the pleading and properly plead facts supporting alter ego
liability).
In this case, the trial court held that the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Jackson
v. Brown, 904 P.2d 685 (Utah 1995), which abolished the Utah cause of action for breach
of a contract to marry, wholly barred Plaintiffs claims and, therefore, dismissed
Plaintiffs Complaint with prejudice. Plaintiff appealed that decision, which this Court
reversed. However, this Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal on the alternative
grounds that the allegations of Plaintiff s Complaint failed to support the asserted causes
of action. In reaching its decision, this Court reviewed Plaintiffs factual allegations as
they related to the elements of each cause of action and determined that Plaintiff had
failed to state claims upon which relief could be granted. Notably, this Court did not
determine that Plaintiff could not allege any facts that would support the asserted causes
of action. Accordingly, regardless of whether this Court correctly ruled or not, Plaintiffs
Complaint should have been dismissed without prejudice, and Plaintiff should be allowed
an opportunity to correct any perceived deficiencies in the factual allegations of his
Complaint.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff requests that this Court modify its Opinion by
stating that Plaintiffs Complaint is dismissed without prejudice, remand this case to the
trial court, and allow Hess reasonable time to amend his Complaint.
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ADDENDUM
Attached hereto as an addendum is this Court's June 21, 2007 Opinion.
DATED this 5th day of July, 2007.
MILLER GUYMON, P.C.

'axtbnR.
Joel T. Zenger, Esq.
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
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ADDENDUM NO. 1

This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
00O00

Layne D. Hess, an individual,

OPINION
(For Official Publication)

Plaintiff, Appellant, and
Cross-appellee,
v.

Case No. 20060497-CA
F I L E D
(June 2 1 , 2007)

Jody Johnston, an individual,
2 0 0 7 UT A p p

213

Defendant, Appellee, and
Cross-appellant.

Third District, Salt Lake Department, 050919801
The Honorable J. Dennis Frederick
Attorneys:

Paxton R. Guymon and Joel T. Zenger, Salt Lake City,
for Appellant and Cross-appellee
David W. Scofield, Salt Lake City, for Appellee and
Cross-appellant

Before Judges Davis, McHugh, and Orme.
McHUGH, Judge:
fl
Plaintiff Layne D. Hess appeals the trial court's order
dismissing his complaint, with prejudice, for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, see Utah R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6). Defendant Jody Johnston cross-appeals, arguing that
the trial court committed error when it denied her motion for
sanctions under rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, see
Utah R. Civ. P. 11. We affirm.
BACKGROUND1

x

In considering the correctness of an order dismissing a
complaint, we assume the truthfulness of each of the facts
alleged by plaintiff. See Oakwood Vill. L.L.C. v. Albertsons,
Inc., 2004 UT 101,^9, 104 P.3d 1226.

f2
Hess and Johnston started dating in mid-April 2 004 and
within three months, they decided to marry. Johnston found an
engagement ring she liked, and Hess commissioned a jeweler to
craft one like it. The couple planned to marry sometime in
November 2004, but mutually decided that they would take their
time in planning the wedding to ensure their finances were in
order.
%3 About this time, Johnston told Hess that, during their
engagement, she wanted to go on some trips and wanted Hess to
have a vasectomy. Hess complied with these requests. Hess began
by paying for the couple to take a seven-day cruise to Alaska at
the end of July. In August, Hess underwent the vasectomy
procedure requested by Johnston. And in September, after
Johnston expressed an interest in traveling to France to
introduce Hess to friends she had met while living there years
earlier, Hess paid for the couple to travel to France for three
weeks. Before leaving on the trip, Hess paid the balance on the
custom engagement ring so that he could present Johnston with it
while in France. After returning from France, Hess and Johnston
twice rescheduled the wedding, first, from November 2 0 04 to May
5, 2005, and then to July 9, 2005. In October 2004, Johnston
also asked Hess to help purchase a vehicle for her son. Hess
contributed $24 0 0 toward the automobile.
1J4
In late April 2 005, without any forewarning or explanation,
Johnston returned the engagement ring to Hess and informed him
that she would not be his wife. Hess attempted, numerous times,
to obtain an explanation from Johnston, but she refused to offer
any excuse for breaking off the engagement.
%5
In November 2005, Hess brought suit against Johnston seeking
restitution under four different legal theories: (1) conditional
gift, (2) unjust enrichment, (3) promissory estoppel or
reasonable reliance, and (4) breach of contract. Central to all
the claims is the argument that but for Johnston's promise to
marry him, Hess would not have paid for the engagement ring, the
Alaskan cruise, the trip to France, or the vehicle for Johnston's
son. Hess sought restitution in the form of reimbursement for
Johnston's portion of the travel expenses, the medical costs of
the vasectomy and a reversal procedure, the money given toward
the vehicle, and the difference between the purchase price of the
engagement ring and its eventual sale price. In response,
Johnston sought sanctions under rule 11 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure and moved to dismiss the complaint, with
prejudice, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. The trial court denied the motion for sanctions but
dismissed the complaint on the ground that Utah has abolished the

20060497-CA
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common law cause of action for breach of a promise to marry.
Both parties appeal.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1|6
Johnston contends that it was error for the trial court to
deny her motion for sanctions under rule 11 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, see Utah R. Civ. P. 11.
[T]he standard of review for evaluating the
denial or imposition of rule 11 sanctions
involves a three-tiered approach:
"(1)
findings of fact are reviewed under the
clearly erroneous standard; (2) legal
conclusions are reviewed under the correction
of error standard; and (3) the type and
amount of sanctions to be imposed [are]
reviewed under an abuse of discretion
standard."
Morse v. Packer, 2000 UT 86,1|l6, 15 P.3d 1021 (quoting Morse v.
Packer, 1999 UT 5,1110, 973 P.2d 4 2 2 ) .
1|7
Hess argues that the trial court erred when it granted
Johnston's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted under rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, see Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
"A [r]ule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss admits the facts alleged in the
complaint but challenges the plaintiff's right to relief based on
those facts." Oakwood Vill. L.L.C. v. Albertsons, Inc. , 2004 UT
101,1(8, 104 P.3d 1226 (quotations omitted). Therefore, when
reviewing a trial court's grant of a 12(b) (6) motion, "we accept
the factual allegations in the complaint as true and interpret
those facts and all inferences drawn from them in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff as the non-moving party."
Id. at %9.
After viewing the facts in this light, the question of whether a
complaint "was properly dismissed for failure to state a claim is
a question of law, which we review for correctness."
Davis v.
Central Utah Counseling Ctr. , 2006 UT 52,1(16, 147 P.3d 390.

ANALYSIS
I.

Rule 11 Sanctions

1)8
Johnston contends that because the Utah Supreme Court has
abolished the cause of action for breach of a promise to marry,
Hess's claims were frivolous and merited sanctions under rule 11.

20060497-CA
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Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides in relevant
part:
(b) . . . By presenting a pleading, written
motion, or other paper to the court . . . an
attorney or unrepresented party is certifying
that to the best of the person's knowledge,
information, and belief, formed after an
inquiry reasonable under the circumstances,

(b)(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal
contentions therein are warranted by existing
law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal of
existing law or the establishment of new
law [.]
Utah R. Civ. P. 11(b). However,
duty to do perfect or exhaustive
standard is whether the research
all the circumstances." Barnard
(Utah 1992).

n

[r]ule 11 does not impose a
research. The appropriate
was objectively reasonable under
v. Sutliff, 846 P.2d 1229, 1236

%9
Johnston argues that Jackson v. Brown, 904 P.2d 685 (Utah
1995) , clearly abolished the cause of action for breach of a
promise to marry, including claims of the type asserted by Hess.
Therefore, she reasons that sanctions were proper because, given
the settled state of the law, Hess would not have brought his
claims had he first made the reasonable inquiry required by rule
ll. 2 We disagree. First, we begin by noting that "the
reasonable inquiry analysis does not hinge solely on whether the
law is clear.
[Instead, t]he focus should be on what the
attorney actually did in researching the law."
Barnard, 846 P.2d
at 1236-37. Second, and perhaps more importantly, we disagree
with Johnston 1 s contention that Jackson clearly bars Hess f s
claims. Instead, we read Jackson as expressly acknowledging the
possibility that some economic claims arising out of a failed
engagement may still be viable.

2

Because Johnston's argument raises a question of law, we
review it for correctness under the second tier of the rule 11
standard of review. See Barnard v. Sutliff, 846 P.2d 1229, 1236
(Utah 1992) (reviewing, for correctness, whether existing law was
clear such that attorney's decision to proceed with claims
demonstrated a failure to make a reasonable inquiry under rule
11) .

20060497-CA
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^[10 In Jackson, the Utah Supreme Court examined the common law
cause of action for breach of a promise to marry.
See 904 P. 2d
at 686-87. In abolishing that claim from Utah's common law, the
court first examined the history of the cause of action, noting
that it "arose over four hundred years ago," when marriage was
viewed primarily as an economic transaction.
Id. at 686.
Because of the economic nature of matrimony, the cause of action
for breach of promise provided an economic remedy to persons who
had relied to their detriment on a recanted promise of marriage.
See id. The court noted, however, that over time "American
marriage customs ha[ve] so changed as to be totally unlike those
prevailing when breach of promise first became actionable."
Id.
The court reasoned that because modern concepts of marriage focus
primarily on emotion--not economics--the breach of promise cause
of action had lost its historical moorings such that "an action
developed to remedy the economic losses resulting from the
withdrawal of a marriage promise . . . [was being] used in this
day and age to redress the emotional losses that follow [ed] ."
Id. at 687 (emphasis added). The supreme court found this use of
a breach of promise claim antithetical to modern policy
considerations and held that the cause of action was no longer
"the proper vehicle" to recover for emotional damages where the
"losses complained of are pride, love, and esteem."
Id. Rather,
the court held that recovery for emotional damages was properly
pursued only through a claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress and only if the strict elements of such a
claim could be established.
See id. at 687-88.
i[ll Despite abolishing the cause of action for breach of a
promise to marry, the Jackson court specifically left open the
question of whether economic damages arising from a broken
engagement could ever be recovered under alternate legal
theories. All the justices agreed that, despite abolishing the
cause of action for breach of a promise to marry, "no injury to a
plaintiff, upon proper showing, goes unremedied."
Id. at 687. A
majority of the court, however, postponed deciding which legal
theories would support recovery of economic damages stemming from
a broken engagement. See id. at 688 (Stewart, J., concurring,
joined by Zimmerman, C.J. & Russon, J.) (stating that the issue
of what theories would support a recovery of economic damages
"should be addressed . . . only when it is properly presented to
[the c]ourt and properly argued by the parties"). Alternatively,
Justice Durham, joined by Justice Howe, anticipated the question
and suggested that "any economic losses suffered because of
[plaintiff's] reasonable reliance upon [defendant's] promise to
marry . . . may be recoverable under a theory of reasonable
reliance or breach of contract."
Id. at 687 (Durham, J.,
concurrinq, joined by Howe, J . ) .

20060497-CA
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i]l2 Because Jackson did not clearly foreclose claims for purely
economic damages, we cannot say that Hess's reading of the law,
alone, supports the conclusion that he did not make a reasonable
inquiry into the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions
contained in the complaint. Rule 11 does not "require the
attorney to reach the correct legal position from the research.
It is enough that the attorney's reading of the law is a
reasonable one." Barnard, 846 P.2d at 1236. Therefore, we
affirm the trial court's denial of Johnston's motion for rule 11
sanctions.
II.

Failure to State a Claim

i)l3 Despite finding that Jackson does not clearly bar his
claims, we nonetheless affirm the trial court's dismissal of
Hess's complaint because the facts as alleged cannot support
recovery under any of the theories pleaded. Cf. Griffith v.
Griffith, 1999 UT 78,18, 985 P.2d 258 (affirming on alternative
grounds).
A.

Conditional Gift

f14 Assuming, without deciding, that Utah would allow recovery
of engagement gifts under a theory of conditional gift, Hess's
claims fail as a matter of law because he has not alleged facts
that could establish that the travel, vasectomy,3 or money for
the vehicle were conditioned on the marriage taking place. 4
Instead, Hess urges this court to adopt the position that any
gift given during the engagement period carries an implied
condition of marriage. We decline to do so. If we were to imply
3

Under the facts of this case, it is not necessary to
address whether a vasectomy, undertaken by one person in a
relationship, can ever be a "gift" to the other person in the
relationship.
4

We note the possible exception of the engagement ring.
See, e.g., Fierro v. Hoel, 465 N.W.2d 669, 671 (Iowa Ct. App.
1990) ("An engagement ring given in contemplation of marriage is
an impliedly conditional gift."); Heiman v. Parrish, 942 P.2d
631, 634 (Kan. 1997) ("Once it is established the ring is an
engagement ring, it is a conditional gift."). However, because
Johnston returned the ring, Hess received back exactly that which
he gave. Consequently, he has already received restitution, and
this court need not address whether the gift of an engagement
ring carries with it an implied condition of marriage requiring
its return when the wedding does not ensue.

20060497-CA
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a condition on all gifts given during the engagement period,
every gift would be recoverable regardless of the size, cost,
significance, or nature of the gift, and without regard to the
surrounding circumstances under which the gift was given.
Surely, the donor will give some gifts during
the engagement period that are intended as
absolute gifts. However, with an implied
condition, the donor would have to expressly
indicate that he does not expect the gift
back in order to make an absolute gift. . . .
turn[ing] traditional gift law on its head.
Cooper v. Smith, 155 Ohio App. 3d 218, 2003-Ohio-6083, 800 N.E.2d
372, at |26.
1)15 Because we do not accept Hess's contention that all gifts
given during the engagement period carry an implied condition of
marriage, and because "one asserting the delivery [of a gift] was
made on some condition . . . has the burden of establishing such
condition" as an element of recovery under a conditional gift
theory, Fierro v. Hoel, 465 N.W.2d 669, 671 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990),
we examine Hess's complaint for allegations that could support
his contention that the gifts were conditional.
^|l6 Hess's complaint states that, in retrospect, Hess would not
have made the expenditures but for Johnston 1 s promise to marry
him. But this assertion, relying on hindsight, even if true, is
not sufficient to establish that the gifts were conditioned on
the marriage taking place. "Whether a gift is conditional or
absolute is a question of the donor's intent, to be determined
from any express declaration by the donor at the time of the
making of the gift or from the circumstances." 38 Am. Jur. 2d
Gifts § 72 (1999) (emphasis added).
^]l7 Here, Hess's complaint fails to include any facts that could
demonstrate, either expressly, by the circumstances, or by the
nature of the gifts that his intent was to condition the gifts on
the marriage taking place. Cf. Mace v. Tingey, 106 Utah 420, 149
P.2d 832, 834 (1944) (evaluating "the intention of the donor, the
situation and relationship of the parties, the kind and character
of the property, and the things said, written or done" in
determining whether an irrevocable gift was given (emphasis
omitted)). First, Hess does not allege that he expressly
conditioned the gifts when he gave them. Second, the alleged
circumstances existing at the time the gifts were made do not
imply that the gifts were conditional.
See, e.g., Maiorana v.
Roj_as, No. 94988KCV2003, 2004 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 669 (N.Y. Civ. Ct.
June 4, 2004) (concluding that ring was not conditional gift when
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circumstances showed it was given on donee's birthday).
But see,
e.g., Fanning v. Iverson, 535 N.W.2d 770, 772 (S.D. 1995)
(holding that circumstances surrounding gift of money implied a
condition of marriage where check memo indicated money was for
wedding expenses). When evaluating the circumstances surrounding
the gift, some jurisdictions will examine the purpose of the gift
and inquire whether that purpose can be achieved only by the
marriage taking place. See, e.g., Wagener v. Papie, 609 N.E.2d
951, 953-54 (111. Ct. App. 1993) (examining circumstances
surrounding gift/sale of family home to future son-in-law and
finding that purpose of gift--to use home as marital home--would
be frustrated when the marriage did not ensue) ; Cooper, 8 00
N.E.2d 372, at U125-27, 32 (finding gift of improvements to the
donee's home were not conditional where donor "merely presumed"
but did not articulate the intention that they would live in the
improved home after they w e d ) ; Restatement of Restitution § 58
cmt. c & illus. 5 (1937) (noting that the gift of a car to a
putative future son-in-law for the purpose of a honeymoon road
trip may be recoverable because the purpose may only be achieved
if the marriage ensues). Here, the facts alleged cannot support
the conclusion that the purposes of the gifts were frustrated
when the wedding did not take place. The complaint states that
the purpose of the Alaskan cruise was to travel for pleasure
before the wedding. The same purpose applied to the Paris trip,
which also had the added purpose of allowing Johnston an
opportunity to introduce Hess to her friends. The vasectomy was
for the purpose of mutuality in birth control. 5 And, the gift of
money to Johnston's son was for the purpose of allowing him to
purchase a vehicle. All of these purposes were achieved despite
the fact that the parties did not marry. Thus, Hess's complaint
fails to state any facts that suggest the circumstances
surrounding these gifts implied they were conditioned on the
marriage.
Hl8 Finally, the nature of the gifts does not give rise to an
inference that they were inherently conditional. Some
jurisdictions have recognized that gifts, like engagement rings,
carry with them an implied condition of marriage due to the
inherent symbolism of the gift. See, e.g., Fierro, 465 N.W.2d at
671 ("The inherent symbolism of [an engagement ring] forecloses
the need to establish an express condition that marriage will
ensue."); Heiman v. Parrish, 942 P.2d 631, 634 (Kan. 1997)
("[E]ngagement rings should be considered, by their very nature,
conditional gifts given in contemplation of marriage."); see also
Restatement of Restitution § 58 cmt. c (noting that a donor may

5

Johnston had already undergone a tubal ligation, but
remained concerned about the possibility of pregnancy.
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be entitled to restitution "if the gift is an engagement ring, a
family heirloom or some other thing intimately connected with the
marriage").
Here, the nature of the gifts — trips, a vasectomy,
and cash given to a third party--carry no inherent inference that
they were conditioned on the marriage.
fl9 Thus, even if Utah recognized recovery under a theory of
conditional gift, which we do not decide today, Hess's claim for
recovery would be barred because none of the alleged facts
support the conclusion that at the time he made the gifts, he did
not intend for them to take effect until the marriage ensued.
Instead, the facts alleged in the complaint can only be read to
support the conclusion that Hess intended an unconditional gift.
We do recognize that the alleged facts suggest that the reason
Hess gave the unconditional gifts was because he and Johnston
were engaged. However, the reason for a gift should not be
confused with a donor's intent that the gift be revokable.
11
'Many gifts are made for reasons that sour with the passage of
time.' Unfortunately, gift law does not allow a donor to
recover/revoke an inter vivos gift simply because his or her
reasons for giving it have 'soured.'"
Cooper v. Smith, 155 Ohio
App. 3d 218, 2003-Ohio-6083, 800 N.E.2d 372, at ^25 (quoting
Albanese v. Indelicate 51 A.2d 110 (N.J. 1947)); see also
Restatement of Restitution § 58 (1937) ("A person who has
conferred a benefit upon another, manifesting that he does not
expect compensation therefor, is not entitled to restitution
merely because his expectation that an existing relation will
continue or that a future relation will come into existence is
not realized, unless the conferring of the benefit is conditioned
thereon."). We therefore affirm the trial court's dismissal of
Hess's cause of action for recovery under a theory of conditional
gift.
B.

Unjust Enrichment

^|20 Hess's complaint does not allege facts sufficient to sustain
a claim for restitution under a theory of unjust enrichment. To
state a claim for unjust enrichment, a plaintiff must allege
facts supporting three elements: "(1) a benefit conferred on one
person by another; (2) an appreciation or knowledge by the
conferee of the benefit; and (3) the acceptance or retention of
the benefit under such circumstances as to make it inequitable
for the conferee to retain the benefit without payment of its
value." Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1248 (Utah 1998)
(quotations omitted). Although Hess has pleaded facts that
support the first two of these elements, his complaint fails to
allege facts that can support the conclusion that it would be
inequitable for Johnston to retain the benefits of the gifts
without payment.
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^[21 Unjust enrichment occurs when a person has and retains money
or benefits that in justice and equity belong to another;
however, l![t]he fact that a person benefits another is not itself
sufficient to require the other to make restitution."
Fowler v.
Taylor/ 554 P.2d 205, 209 (Utah 1976). Money or benefits that
have been "officiously or gratuitously furnished are not
recoverable." Jeffs, 970 P.2d at 1248 (quotation omitted). A
person acts gratuitously when, at the time he conferred the
benefit, "there was no expectation of a return benefit,
compensation, or consideration."
Id. at 1246. As previously
discussed, Hess's complaint fails to allege that, at the time the
vacations, vasectomy, and money for the vehicle were given, he
intended anything other than an unconditional gift.
" [E] ririchment of the donee is the intended purpose of a gift,
[therefore,] there is nothing 'unjust1 about allowing [the donee]
to retain the gifts she received . . . in the absence of fraud,
overreaching or some other circumstance." 6 Cooper, 800 N.E.2d
372, at 1|l5. Thus, the benefits were gratuitously bestowed on
Johnston, and the trial court properly dismissed Hess's unjust
enrichment claim.
C.

Promissory Estoppel 7

^|22 Like unjust enrichment, promissory estoppel is an equitable
remedy and should be employed where injustice can be avoided only
by enforcement of the promise. To state a claim for promissory
estoppel, Hess must allege four elements:
(1) [t]he plaintiff acted with prudence and
in reasonable reliance on a promise made by
the defendant; (2) the defendant knew that
the plaintiff had relied on the promise which
the defendant should reasonably expect to
induce action or forbearance on the part of
the plaintiff or a third person; (3) the
defendant was aware of all material facts;
and (4) the plaintiff relied on the promise
and the reliance resulted in a loss to the
plaintiff.

6

Hess has not alleged that Johnston fraudulently promised to
marry him.
7

Hess also characterizes his claim for promissory estoppel
as a claim of reasonable reliance. We, therefore, treat them
together under the rubric of promissory estoppel.
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Youncrblood v. Auto-Owners Ins, Co. , 2007 UT 28,1(16 (quotations
omitted). Here, Hess has failed to allege facts that would
support the first element, that he acted with prudence and
reasonable reliance on Johnston's promise to marry.
1(23 A promise to marry is unique in that it is not generally
considered enforceable, but instead is made for the purpose of
"allow [ing] a couple time to test the permanency of their
feelings." Fierro v. Hoel, 465 N.W.2d 669, 672 (Iowa Ct. App.
1990). Thus, the fact that the engagement period is, in essence,
a test period makes reliance on the promise of marriage
inherently problematic because "[w]hen either party lacks . . .
assurance, for whatever reason, the engagement should be broken."
Id.; see also Jackson v. Brown, 904 P.2d 685, 687 (Utah 1995)
("It is certainly the policy of the state to uphold marriage
vows. However, we see no benefit in discouraging or penalizing
persons who realize, before making these vows, that for whatever
reason, they are unprepared to take such an important step."). 8
This is especially true when, as here, the couple had not even
set an actual date for their nuptials.9 Cf. Gilbert v. Barkes,
987 S.W.2d 772, 777 (Ky. 1999) (holding that recovery was
unavailable because where no wedding date is set, the plaintiff
could not "affirmatively demonstrate the parties' final and
serious intent to enter into marriage"). Without foreclosing the
possibility that, in some instances, the acts undertaken in
8

After all,
[w]hat fact justifies the breaking of an
engagement? The absence of a sense of humor?
Differing musical tastes? Differing
political views? The painfully learned fact
that marriages are made on earth, not in
heaven. They must be approached with
intelligent care and should not happen
without a decent assurance of success. When
either party lacks that assurance, for
whatever reason, the engagement should be
broken. No justification is needed. Either
party may act. Fault, impossible to fix,
does not count.
Fierro v. Hoel, 465 N.W.2d 669, 672 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990).
9

Hess does allege that in late 2004 the couple eventually
set an actual wedding date for May 5, 2005. However, at the time
the trips were taken, the vasectomy was performed, and the money
was given to Johnston's son, the couple had not yet set an actual
date for a wedding but were, instead, tentatively planning to
marry sometime in November 2004.
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reliance on a promise of marriage can be so intertwined with the
promise itself that reliance may be reasonable, 10 in this
instance, Hess's complaint fails to allege facts that can support
the conclusion that he was acting prudently and reasonably on
Johnston's promise of marriage. All that can be inferred from
the facts alleged in the complaint is that Hess made several
irrevocable gifts during the engagement period. Thus, this is
not a situation where "injustice can be avoided" only by awarding
restitution damages, Skanchy v. Calcados Ortope SA, 952 P.2d
1071, 1077 (Utah 1998), and Hess's promissory estoppel claim
fails as a matter of law.
D.

Breach of Contract

1)24 Similarly, even assuming without deciding that Jackson v.
Brown, 904 P.2d 685 (Utah 1995), does not preclude a claim for
breach of contract based on reciprocal promises to marry, Hess's
claim fails because his allegations cannot support a conclusion
that the damages were causally related to the breach.
i|2 5 Hess does not allege that Johnston made any promise to repay
him if the marriage did not ensue; she never promised to pay for
half of the travel, or to bear the cost of the vehicle herself.
The only promise Johnston made was to marry Hess. Thus, in order
to recover general damages, Hess would be required to show that
the damages or injuries he sustained "flow[ed] naturally from the
breach" of that promise. Machan v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am.,
2005 UT 37,1|15, 116 P. 3d 342 (quotations omitted). Or, to
recover consequential damages, Hess must demonstrate that the
damages he sustained were "reasonably within the contemplation
of, or reasonably foreseeable, by the parties at the time the
contract was made." Id. (quotations omitted). Under the
circumstances of this case, none of the allegations show how
restitution for gifts of travel, a vasectomy, and money to a
third party flow naturally from a breach of a promise to marry or
were reasonably contemplated by the parties at the time they
decided to wed. As previously discussed, none of these gifts or
the circumstances under which they were given suggest that they
were in any way conditioned on the promise to marry being
fulfilled. Additionally, neither the travel, the vasectomy, nor
the gift of money to Johnston's son were preparatory acts

10

As noted in Jackson v. Brown, 904 P.2d 685 (Utah 1995), it
may be reasonable, under certain circumstances, to rely on
another's promise of marriage when undertaking "normal expenses
attendant to a wedding."
Id. at 687. However, we do not reach
that question because Hess is not seeking recovery of expenses
directly related to a wedding.
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required to be performed under the contract to marry. To hold
otherwise would give rise to a claim for breach of contract-albeit for economic damages instead of emotional damages--"any
time a person, for whatever reason, cancels or indefinitely
postpones wedding plans." Jackson,
904 P.2d at 687. This result
is clearly "contrary to the public policy of this state" because
"such an action [would] be readily amenable to abuse [and] would
discourage individuals with legitimate doubts or concerns about a
planned wedding from cancelling the event." Id. Therefore,
Hess's claims for restitution under a breach of contract theory
were properly dismissed as a matter of law.
CONCLUSION
%2G Rule 11 sanctions are inappropriate where, as here,
counsel's interpretation of existing law is reasonable and there
is no other evidence demonstrating counsel's failure to make a
reasonable inquiry required by rule 11. Therefore, the trial
court's denial of Johnston's motion for sanctions was proper. It
was also proper for the trial court to dismiss Hess's complaint
because the facts alleged could not support recovery of
restitution under any of the grounds pleaded.
%21

Affirmed.

Carolyn B. McHugh, Judge
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WE CONCUR:

James Z. Davis, Judge

Gregory K. Orme, Judge
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